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While policy and academic discourses point to important shifts in EU development policy, 
it remains difficult to ascertain the level of these changes. The main aim of this article is 
to propose a research agenda on change and continuity in EU development policy. Drawing 
on the literatures on paradigm change and post-development, this involves four key 
questions for future research: (1) How can we map the EU’s current paradigm? (2) How 
can we map changes and continuities in this regard? (3) How can we explain changes and 
continuities? (4) What role do policy experiments play in this regard? In addressing these 
four questions, the article pays particular attention to what we already know from existing 
literature and to what issues could guide future research. We highlight that ostensibly 
significant changes are often ‘merely’ second order changes that do not challenge 
underlying philosophical ideas of the Eurocentric, modernist and colonial paradigm. 
Specifically, we point at the importance of studying whether policy experiments ‘reinvent’ 
this paradigm or induce paradigmatic change. In the conclusions, we summarize the 
research agenda and reflect on the need of a better acknowledgement of the ‘PlEUriverse’ 
of alternatives to ‘development’ within Europe. 
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The year 2020 has been labelled a ‘pivotal year’ for EU-Africa relations (European 
Commission 2020). The 10th AUC-EC Commission-to-Commission meeting in Addis Ababa 
in February 2020, attended by Commissioner President Ursula Von der Leyen and 21 other 
EU Commissioners, was announced as ‘a new chapter’ (Urpilainen 2020) and a critical step 
towards bringing the EU-Africa partnership ‘to the next level’ (European Commission 
2020), and putting an end to a historically asymmetric relationship. The EU envisages ‘a 
change of narrative (…) in moving from development aid to a true partnership’, in areas 
such as trade, investment and migration (Euronews 2020). The chair of the European 
Parliament committee on international development stressed that this reorientation should 
be ‘more than just a continuation of the present, with a twist’. It should indeed be ‘reset’, 
‘a fresh start’ based on ‘a shift of thought’ and go beyond the ‘obsolete donor-recipient 
mentality’ (Tobé 2020). In October 2019, the new European Commission was also 
established with a new Commissioner for ‘International Partnerships’ instead of 
‘Development’ in an attempt to adapt the ‘European model of development’ to ‘new global 
realities’ (Von der Leyen 2019). 
 
This suggests a radical break with the past. However, discourse on a ‘new era’ based on a 
‘partnership of equals’ dates back from 1975 (Langan 2009). Similarly, the purported shift 
from ‘aid’ to ‘trade’ (mostly free trade) is a constant in EU discourse on North-South 
relations, and also the migration-development nexus has figured prominently in European 
discourse since the 2000s (Lavenex andand Kunz 2008). Nonetheless, there have been 
discursive shifts, most recently in stressing the ‘sustainability’ of development and the 
need for a ‘geopolitical’ approach (Holden 2014). Hence, it remains difficult to ascertain 
change and continuity in EU development policy. 
 
The main aim of this article is to propose a research agenda around the question of 
paradigm change in EU development policy. Are we witnessing a creative ‘reinvention of 
the wheel’ or a true paradigm change – and how can this be studied? In doing so, we do 
not only make use of the rich scholarship on EU foreign aid, as exemplified in this special 
issue. We also draw from literatures on paradigm change and post-development. First, 
scholarship about ‘paradigm change’ has theorized different degrees of change and levels 
of policy ideas. We are most interested in ‘third order change’, which involves shifts of 
‘philosophical ideas’ (Schmidt 2011). Policy experiments may be the harbinger of paradigm 
change or serve to ‘reinvent’ and ‘stretch’ the existing paradigm (Hall 1994). Second, 
critical voices in development studies provide a clearer picture of the current development 
paradigm and possible future scenarios (Baud et al. 2019). Post-development scholars 
identify western development policy as being ‘Eurocentric, modernist and colonial’ (EMC) 
(see Mignolo andand Walsh 2018; Schöneberg 2016; Escobar 2015) and suggest a 
‘Pluriverse’ of alternatives to development (Kothari et al. 2019).  
 
In contrast, EU development studies have shielded away from questions of paradigm 
change. While other EU policy domains have been researched from this perspective (e.g. 
Falkner 2016), EU development studies predominantly frame the challenges of EU 
development policy through the ‘norms versus interests’ dichotomy, emphasizing how 
moral principles of EU development policy become subordinated to strategic interests (e.g. 
Olivié andand Pérez 2020; Hadfield andand Lightfoot 2020; Beringer et al. 2019). Similarly, 
advocacy organizations consistently point at the tension between EU interests and 
normative goals (Rozbicka andand Szent‐Iványi 2020). Building on these studies, our 
research agenda starts from the argument that there is need for an understanding of 
current challenges that goes beyond the ‘norms vs interests’ tension. The paradigm and 
post-development literatures provide useful tools in this regard. We assume that the 
Eurocentric, modernist and colonial paradigm that has shaped the EU’s relations with the 
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Global South over the past 60 years is being faced with several difficulties, but that it 
seems not (yet) to be seriously challenged.  
Our proposed research agenda aims to grasp this puzzle. Specifically, we will identify four 
questions for future research that will determine the structure of the article. The next 
section will set out the theoretical tools for further analysis, building on paradigm change 
literature. Then, we will discuss how to map the current EU development paradigm 
(question 1) as well as changes and continuities over time (question 2). In doing so, we 
will emphasize that ostensibly significant changes, for instance the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), are often ‘merely’ second order changes that do not challenge 
underlying philosophical ideas. The subsequent section will turn to explanations. We will 
systematically elaborate on how (a) (perceived) crises and policy failures, (b) epistemic 
changes, and (c) power changes may induce paradigmatic change (question 3). Finally, 
we attempt to demonstrate the relevance of research into policy experiments that might 
harbour the seeds of eventual paradigm change or be instrumental in safeguarding the 
existing paradigm (question 4). Illustrations will involve EU aid for the African Peace Facility 
(APF), blending through the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), linking 
migration and development through the Migration Trust Fund, cash transfers and vouchers 
in humanitarian aid, and constructing climate-development nexus through the Global 
Climate Change Alliance (GCCA). Finally, in the conclusions we reflect on the relevance of 
these questions for broader societal debates on development within Europe, and argue 
how the PlEUriverse could better acknowledge the diversity of views. 
 
PARADIGM CHANGE: TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Our conceptual toolbox for understanding changes and continuities in EU development 
policy paradigms mainly builds on Peter Hall (1993) and Vivien Schmidt (2011). According 
to Hall, a paradigm can be considered as ‘a framework of ideas and standards that specifies 
not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, 
but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall 1993: 
279). His conceptualization builds on the assumption that changes occur at three levels, 
namely at the level of instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy 
of goals behind the policy. At the ideational level, Hall’s three categories roughly 
correspond to Schmidt’s distinction between different ‘levels of generality’ of ideas, namely 
policy, programmatic, and philosophical ideas (Schmidt 2011; see Figure 1). 
Accordingly, analysing the changes in the UK’s macroeconomic policy in the 1970s and 
1980s, Hall (1993) distinguished three ‘orders of change’. First order changes only involve 
adjustments in the settings of existing instrument (or policy ideas; Schmidt 2011). Second 
order change refers to innovations at the level of the instruments themselves (or 
programmatic ideas; Schmidt 2011). Hall’s most fundamental third category involves 
‘radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a ‘paradigm 
shift’ (Hall 1993: 279), or what Schmidt called ‘underlying philosophies of public policy’ 
(Schmidt 2011). The latter are ‘big ideas’ that ‘generally stay deep in the background’ and 
‘are rarely contested except at moments of deep crisis’ (Schmidt 2011). First and second 
order changes can be considered as ‘normal policy making’, corresponding to Thomas 
Kuhn’s ‘normal science’, including adjustments that point at continuity rather than ruptures 
in policy (Kuhn 1962). In contrast, third order changes indicate discontinuity, radical 












Figure 1: Paradigm change 
 
Source: authors, based on Hall (1993) and Schmidt (2011). 
 
Paradigm shifts do not occur automatically. Based on theoretical literature, we can 
distinguish between three necessary conditions that precede such a radical change. First, 
instances of policy failures are likely to play a central role in the process of paradigm 
change. In response to major events and crises (Hall 1993: 285-291), which are causally 
attributed to the existing paradigm (Goldstein 1993: 13-14), changes in policy are thus 
introduced in response to discontent about (the results of) existing policies. A second 
condition constitutes the changing views of experts towards the ideas of a new paradigm. 
In response to the policy failures, officials and knowledge institutions start searching for 
alternatives. Credible and coherent challengers of the status quo can play a key role (Hall 
1993: 286; Goldstein 1993: 14). Finally, power shifts are a third critical condition for a 
paradigm change to occur. Supporters of the new paradigm should get authority to 
institutionalize the new paradigm via new policies and instruments (Hall 1993: 280). These 
three factors can be seen as socially constructed or as objective facts – indeed, as 
suggested by Blyth (2013), the strength of Hall’s framework is that the notion of ‘paradigm’ 
allows to build bridges between different (constructivist and rationalist) theoretical schools 
of thought.  
 
Importantly, paradigm shifts typically go together with policy experiments. The 
accumulation of anomalies that follow from policy failures, epistemic changes and power 
shifts, lead policymakers to respond with ‘ad hoc’ solutions in an attempt ‘to stretch the 
terms of the paradigm to cover them’ (Hall 1994: 280). Kuhn defined this as the stage 
where scientists push the boundaries of normal science through exploratory ‘extraordinary 
research’ in an attempt to address the state of crisis in their discipline (Kuhn 1962). 
However, ‘this gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original 
paradigm’ (Hall 1993: 280). Hence, paradoxically, while these experiments initially serve 










Figure 2: Research agenda 
 
This brief theoretical exploration results in four key questions that constitute our research 
agenda on paradigms in EU development policy (Figure 2). First, how can we map the EU’s 
current paradigm? This exercise can make use of the three layers of policy ideas. Second, 
how can we map changes and continuities in this regard? Here, the distinction between 
different orders of change can be useful. Third, how can we explain changes and 
continuities? The three conditions identified in the literature can guide research into this 
question. Fourth, what role do policy experiments play in this story? Case studies of alleged 
policy innovations may shed light on the extent to which paradigms are eroded, polished 
or reinvented. The subsequent sections of this article will elaborate on each of these 
questions, paying particular attention to what we know from existing literature and hinting 
at directions for further research. 
 
 
MAPPING THE PRESENT, PAST AND FUTURE  
While some scholars have analyzed evolutions in EU development thinking (e.g. Scholte 
andand Söderbaum 2017; Doidge andand Holland 2015; Farrell 2008), and even suggested 
paradigmatic shifts (e.g. Carbone 2013a), what exactly constitutes the EU’s paradigm and 
how it has evolved over time remains understudied. Attempting to characterize the EU’s 
development paradigm, we build on the insights of post-development thinking. Scholars 
within this field have identified the overarching policy goals of western (including EU) 
development policy as being ‘Eurocentric and modernist/colonial’ (EMC) (see Mignolo 
andand Walsh 2018; Demaria andand Kothari 2017; Schöneberg 2016; Escobar 2015). 
Development is seen as a discourse of Western origin that has operated as a powerful 
mechanism for the cultural, social and economic production of the ‘Third World’ (Escobar 
1995). In contrast to the ‘image of continuous innovation that the development industry 
constructs and tries to convey’ (Ziai 2016: 199), Ziai argues that the central and constant 
tenets of the EMC paradigm remain: (1) the definition of the problem in terms of global 
poverty, (2) the promise that this problem can be solved today through (3) technical 
solutions and economic growth and (4) the credo of harmonious objectives amongst all 
parties involved, developed and developing countries (Ziai 2016). These four elements 
constitute the philosophical ideas that are core to the EMC paradigm.  
 
The EMC paradigm has been dominant since US President Harry Truman’s inaugural 
address on assistance to developing countries in 1949 (and some would say, since Europe’s 
colonial expansion) (Ziai 2016). It has also characterized the EU since the early years of 
European integration (Hansen andand Jonsson 2014). The ‘birth act’ of the European 
project – the Monnet-Schuman declaration of 1950 – saw ‘the development of the African 
continent’ as one of Europe’s ‘essential tasks’. Part Four of the Treaty of Rome provided 
special trade and aid relations with the member states’ colonies for the promotion of their 
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development. Despite some distinctive accents, the EU has largely followed trends of 
western donors within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations and the World Bank (Doidge andand Holland 2015; Farrell 
2008). Western development thinking has evolved since 1949, but these shifts constitute 
‘second order changes’ that introduce new policy instruments without radically challenging 
the overarching policy goals of the EMC paradigm. These second order changes range from 
the Modernization Theory (1950s-60s), with brief challenges from Dependency Theory 
(1960-1970), over the Washington Consensus (1970-80s), towards the post-Washington 
Consensus or Human Development approach (since the end 1990s) (Doidge andand 
Holland 2015) and the Sustainable Development narrative (Ziai 2016). All these variants 
constitute ‘development alternatives’ or programmatic ideas that concern the changes in 
instruments without questioning underlying goals. Essentially, the western model is 
promoted, and intervention is legitimized for the purpose of development. However, the 
history of EU development policy has not been analysed systematically from this 
perspective (for partial analyses, see Profant 2019; Langan 2018; Holden 2014; Rutazibwa 
2010). 
 
While making clear that historical changes are less historical than they seem, this research 
agenda also requires us to analyze future scenarios. The EU public policy domain of 
development is obviously undergoing significant changes and challenges since the creation 
of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU’s ‘geopolitical’ agenda, the 
emerging/emerged powers such as China, India and Brazil, the budgetary constraints on 
member states’ aid resources, mounting impact of extreme right populist parties, and 
stronger nexuses between development and trade, investment, climate and migration (see 
other contributions to this special issue). This fast-changing context may conceal, however, 
that the EMC paradigm still remains standing. A research agenda into paradigm change 
forces us not only to analyse historical antecedents but also to explore possible future 
avenues. If ongoing changes do not entail a paradigm shift, what are then the second order 
shifts that we may witness in the coming decades? 
Here we provide a first attempt to delineate the contours of such scenarios. We schematize 
these according to whether they are (a) based on mainly European values or interests and 
(b) foresee a key role for private players or public authorities (Table 1). We need to note, 
however, that these four scenarios all share the basic tenets of the EMC paradigm which 
goes beyond the ‘values versus interests’ distinction. 
 
Table 1: Second order scenarios 
 Private Public 
Interests Marketisation Securitisation 
Values Charitisation Humanitarisation 
 
First, the marketisation scenario involves a radical promotion of free trade and investment. 
Instead of aid, the recipe for development (in terms of growth and hence welfare) is to 
deepen and enlarge markets (cf. Langan 2018; Heron andand Siles-Brügge 2012). Private 
players are key while public authorities need to guarantee the functioning of the market. 
Second, under the securitisation scenario the EU invests heavily in the protection of 
borders and guaranteeing of security (cf. Furness andand Gänzle 2016; Keukeleire and 
Raube 2013). Public authorities play a key role in safeguarding borders and security 
through all means available – including development aid. Third, charitisation means that 
seemingly apolitical interventions are legitimized for the purpose of saving lives (cf. Pariat 
2019; Orbie and Van Elsuwege 2014). While governments are involved in aid, also 
contributions by private donors and charities are supported. Aid is not necessarily driven 
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by emotional and media-driven factors; the impact of aid on health in the South can also 
be measured scientifically (cf. below on the Nobel Prize in Economics 2019). Fourth, 
humanitarisation involves legitimized intervention by the EU and its member states to 
safeguard democracy and human rights in third countries (cf. Visoka and Musliu 2019). 
This includes military interventions. 
 
These scenarios are to be extended and elaborated in future research. As explained below, 
one way to do this is through case studies on how policy experiments might contribute to 
certain scenarios. Future EU development policy is undoubtedly going to involve a mix of 
different scenarios, e.g. marketization and securitization (Holden 2017). The point is, 
however, that second order and third order changes should be distinguished, as all 
aforementioned scenarios, for all their differences, have in common that they remain firmly 
entrenched in the EMC paradigm. Ostensibly significant changes may not necessarily entail 
a paradigm shift. For instance, all these second order scenarios imply that the EU 
intervenes legitimately in third countries for the purpose of ‘development’, based on its 
alleged internal experiences; there are also no discernible changes to power structures or 
alternative views on economic growth. 
 
This raises the question of what a real paradigm shift could potentially be? Reflecting on 
alternative paradigms – which thus involve changes of philosophical ideas – is challenging. 
Again, however, post-development studies can provide some guidance. Mignolo discerns a 
paradigm otro emerging from Latin America and elsewhere: ‘another way of thinking that 
runs counter to the great modernist narratives (Christianity, liberalism, and Marxism).’ 
(Mignolo, in Escobar 2007: 180). A recent edited volume exposes a ‘Pluriverse’ (Kothari et 
al. 2019) of alternatives to development, including concepts originating from Latin America 
(Buen Vivir; Zapatista Autonomy), Africa (Ubuntu) but also the so-called ‘North’ 
(De/Postgrowth; Commons). However, a clearly defined alternative proposal would run 
counter to the purpose of post-development thinkers, who above all have in common that 
they criticize the hegemonic EMC paradigm and cherish epistemic diversity. Inspired by 
the Zapatistas of Chiapas, they imagine a ‘world in which many worlds fit’, a ‘matrix of 
alternatives, from universe to pluriverse’ that cannot be reduced to a single overarching 
policy framework (Kothari et al. 2019: xxviii). Nonetheless, ‘transformative alternatives’ 
do share the ambition to ‘go to the roots of the problem’, encompassing an ‘ethic that is 
radically different from the one underpinning the current system’, reflecting ‘values 
grounded in a relational logic’ (Kothari et al. 2019: xxiv).1 Not surprisingly, there is also 
much debate and diversity within ‘post-development’ – a contested term even for some 
leading authors in the debate. Importantly, despite the appeal of post-development 
thinking to those (formerly) committed to development policy, there may also be less 
emancipatory alternatives. In this regard, Ziai (2014) makes an interesting distinction 
between the (ideal) ‘radical democracy’ variants of ‘sceptical post-development’ and the 
dangerous ‘neo-populist’ strands from ‘reactionary post-development’:  
 
Sceptical (postdevelopment) PD does not generally reject all elements of modernity 
but promotes cultural hybridization, is critical towards cultural traditions, abstains 
from articulating desirable models of society and employs a dynamic, constructivist 
concept of culture. Neo-populist PD does reject modern industrial society altogether 
and promotes the return to (often idealized) subsistence communities, employing an 
essentialist concept of culture. Whereas sceptical PD thus leads to a radical democratic 
position, neo-populist PD potentially has reactionary consequences, as it is able to 
dismiss people’s desire for ‘development’ as the results of ideology and manipulation, 
based on privileged knowledge on their ‘real’ needs — bringing PD scholars indeed in 
a position dangerously close to that of the ‘development experts’ they criticize so 
sharply. (Ziai 2015: 837) 
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Other (western or non-western) hegemonies may also appear that replace one oppressive 
paradigm by another one. Furthermore, research into philosophical ideas may involve even 
deeper layering (cf. Falkner 2016 on a ‘fourth level’). 
In sum, the research agenda requires us to get a clearer picture of the current EMC 
paradigm, its history and its future, at both philosophical and programmatic levels. Having 
identified a basic understanding of these issues for further research, the next points on the 
research agenda concern explanations. How can we theorize change and continuity in EU 
development policy? And how should we understand the role of policy experiments? 
 
EXPLAINING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
Policy Failures 
The perception of crisis and policy failure is crucial to understand (the absence of) 
paradigmatic change. The lack of developmental impact of the EU’s policies on the South 
has been widely documented. Despite continuous criticisms, the response has typically 
been to change and improve existing instruments without challenging underlying goals. In 
the following paragraphs, we will illustrate this point by focusing on three flagship 
programmes that were meant to improve development effectiveness since the 2000s: (a) 
fostering Policy Coherence for Developed (PCD), (b) enhancing European coordination, and 
(c) strengthening ownership and partnership. 
 
First, while at its inception in 2005 PCD was supposed to take account of development 
objectives in other policies that affect developing countries, today the EU still seriously 
lacks coherence on many development issues, including trade (Carbone and Orbie 2015; 
Faber and Orbie 2009a), agriculture and fisheries (Matthews 2015), migration (Langan 
2018; Van Criekinge 2015; Lavenex and Kunz 2008), humanitarian aid (Orbie and Van 
Elsuwege 2014) or security (Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Haastrup 2013; Del Biondo et al. 
2012; Olsen 2009). While in 2009 the EU’s PCD strategy still focused on 12 policy areas, 
it was subsequently narrowed down to five strategic challenges: trade and finance, climate 
change, food security, migration, and security. After ten years, research indicates that PCD 
has indeed been a ‘mission impossible’ (Carbone 2008a). For instance, the EU’s efforts to 
align trade policy with development objectives through ‘Everything but Arms’ (Faber and 
Orbie 2009b), the ‘Generalized System of Preferences’ (Siles-Brügge 2014) and ‘Aid for 
Trade’ (Brazys and Lightfoot 2016; Holden 2014), have been criticized for imposing an EU-
centered and market-oriented agenda. Most critique in academic and policy debates has 
focused on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the former 
colonies of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group (Weinhardt and Moerland 2017; 
Heron and Murray-Evans 2016; Del Felice 2012). A recent survey concludes that PCD 
results are modest because of limited political will with EU member states and bureaucratic 
obstacles within the EU institutions (Carbone and Keijzer 2016). This ongoing incoherence 
is argued to severely reduce the EU’s international credibility (Carbone 2013b). 
 
Second, although the EU has shown a remarkable commitment towards strengthening 
coordination for many decades and developed several policy instruments for this purpose, 
the EU still fails to act effectively as a coordinator in practice. The literature has pointed to 
numerous collective action problems that challenge effective EU coordination in 
development (Carbone 2017; Klingebiel et al 2017; Furness and Vollmer 2013). Indications 
of the effective and practical impact of EU coordination are also hard to find in the field, 
where the EU risks duplicating coordination instead of providing real added value (Jones 
and Mazzara 2018; Delputte 2013). Even joint programming, the flagship of EU 
development coordination, has yielded limited results so far. The claim that joint 
programming paves the way for joint implementation has only materialised in a small 
number of countries (i.e. Kenya and Cambodia) (ECDPM 2015). Where joint programming 
appears relatively successful, it often builds on pre-existing collaborations between donors 
(Orbie et al. 2017). As with PCD, to the extent that coordination is taking place, this is 
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mainly done to increase the EU’s impact in its external action instead of to improve aid and 
development effectiveness (Delputte and Orbie forthcoming). 
Finally, attempts to forge ‘equal partnerships’ and increase partner country ownership also 
remain limited in practice (Kotsopoulos and Mattheis 2018; Delputte and Williams 2016; 
Carbone 2013b; Rutazibwa 2010). Efforts to increase European coordination in the name 
of aid effectiveness have made it more difficult to involve third countries (Carbone 2008b). 
The European Commission’s evaluation of Joint Programming concludes that this process 
has been ‘very valuable for the EU and Member States’ but also that it ‘has remained very 
much an EU and Member States exercise, not sufficiently involving the Partner Country, 
whether the Government or the civil society organisations, or involving them very late in 
the process at a time when priorities had already been agreed’ (European Commission 
2017: ii). Strikingly, assessments of some of the more recent policy instruments such as 
blending facilities and trust funds point out that partner countries have even been more 
sidelined than in some of the more ‘traditional’ aid instruments (CONCORD 2018a; Orbie 
et al 2018; Castillejo 2017). 
 
These policy failures have partially been recognized by the EU itself, as exemplified by the 
rationale of the Agenda for Change (2011) to ‘increase the impact of EU development 
policy’, the need for ‘innovative’ financial instruments, or finding ‘new ways of engaging 
with the private sector’ (European Commission 2011). However, there is no evidence of a 
sense of crisis within the EU development institutions, let alone a perception of an overall 
failure of EU Development. For instance, the Commission’s recent PCD evaluation 
concludes that the EU exercises a ‘leading role’, that the Commission ‘has acted as a lead 
institution’, and that the member states ‘have affirmed their political will’ to promote PCD 
– although it is then also added that it remains ‘very challenging’ to assess impact 
(European Commission 2019d: 28). Recently, more consideration is given to scientific 
studies on the impact of development assistance. For example, the experiment-based 
approach to development economics of Nobel Prize winners Banerjee, Duflo and Kremer 
has become very influential within governments, international agencies, and NGOs. While 
their experimental research methods to test the effectiveness of development 
interventions on poverty reduction are said to have ‘transformed’ the field of development 
economics (Nobel Prize 2019), they have been criticized for taking a ‘conformist rather 
than critical’ attitude to development (Reddy 2013). In general, the EU continues to pride 
itself of being the biggest donor (cf. European Commission 2019a) and a leading 
development actor (cf. European Commission 2019b). The worldwide success in reducing 
poverty is continuously emphasized, while the causal role of EU aid in improving 
‘development’ is being neglected. 
 
While existing research has demonstrated quite convincingly the failure of these initiatives 
to deliver on development, there remains scope for more in-depth studies that not only 
gauge the EU’s impact but also analyse how negative evaluations are interpreted within 
EU decision-making, how they serve to induce first and second order changes without 




Researching paradigm change also involves an investigation of epistemic shifts: to what 
extent is current thinking being challenged by alternative ideas, and do the latter involve 
radical change at the level of philosophical ideas? As mentioned above, while EU 
development policy thinking is continuously undergoing changes, existing research has 
focused more on the apparent changes and less on the underlying continuities. Recent 
research concerns epistemic shifts in the EU’s established policy and knowledge institutions 
around DG DEVCO, in response to the policy failures and the changing development 
landscape. Below we discuss how the EU has emphasized (a) a more ‘global’ approach in 
line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), (b) a more ‘comprehensive’ approach 
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through the nexuses with migration, trade, security and climate, and (c) a ‘beyond aid’ 
approach through which aid is slowly losing relevance. 
First, whereas for decades ago EU development cooperation was mainly organized 
alongside bilateral or interregional mental boundaries, a shift has been made towards a 
more holistic globalist approach to today’s development challenges that goes beyond 
national and regional restrictions. This epistemic change reflects the increased attention 
for the global ‘commons’ and the universality principle that is central to the attainment of 
the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs (Scholte and Söderbaum 2017). While the European 
Commission discourse also tacitly recognizes that ‘there is no single path to development’ 
(Mimica 2019), the principle of universalism, central to the Agenda 2030, has become the 
dominant leitmotiv: ‘Crucially, this new agreement is universal. It applies to all countries. 
We all share ownership of it and we all have a shared responsibility for its implementation.’ 
(Mimica 2015, bold in original). The new European Consensus situates itself within the 
Agenda 2030, emphasizing that the SDGs ‘are universal and apply to all countries at all 
stages of development’ (EU 2017: 3). 
 
Second, in recent years, thinking in development circles has evolved from treating 
development policy as an independent and self-standing area of EU external policy (late 
1990s - early 2000s) towards emphasizing the ‘inevitable’ linkages or ‘nexuses’ between 
different policy areas (from mid-2000s onwards) (Bergmann et al. 2019). The notion of 
the ‘nexus’ between development policy and other policy domains like environment/climate 
change (De Roeck et al. 2018; Adelle et al 2018; Lightfoot 2015; Gupta and van der Grijp 
2010), migration (Langan 2018; Kunz 2013), trade (Carbone and Orbie 2014; Siles-Brügge 
2014; Young and Peterson 2013) or security (Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Del Biondo et 
al. 2012), and the need for ‘comprehensive’ responses to complex situations has 
increasingly gained ground over the years and has now become a guiding principle of the 
EU’s development policy. This shift in development discourse also corresponds with the 
evolution from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) towards the SDGs at the 
international level. Embedded within the Agenda 2030, the new European Consensus also 
links development challenges to other policy fields, adding also the objectives of 
democracy, rule of law and human rights (EU 2017). 
 
Finally, since the mid-2000s a shift can be observed whereby development officials have 
increasingly been embracing the idea to think ‘beyond aid’. Already in 2009, the 
Commission had to admit that the levels of official development assistance (ODA) were ‘by 
and large insufficient to reach EU and international agreed targets’ (European Commission 
2009: 19), and some years later it was stated that ‘there is a delay equivalent to about 25 
years on the path to 0.7 per cent’ (European Commission 2012: 10). At the same time, 
the EU started to emphasize ‘innovative financing mechanisms’ to complement traditional 
ODA, such as domestic revenues, remittances, investments or international tax 
cooperation (European Commission 2012; European Council 2010). The beyond aid 
approach, of which the PCD agenda is also an example, has served to legitimize the EU’s 
limited compliance with its aid targets (Delputte et al. 2016). However, EU documents also 
continue to stress the importance of ODA and the 0.7 per cent target. The New European 
Consensus on Development reiterates the 0.7 per cent commitment, but also strongly 
emphasizes the need for innovative financing instruments (EU 2017). 
 
Moreover, the EU seems to have reinforced its ‘partnership’ discourse. Although emphasis 
on ‘equal partnership’ is far from a new phenomenon in EU relations with the Global South 
(as discussed in the introduction), the renaming of the ‘Commissioner for Development’ 
into a ‘Commissioner for International Partnerships’ under the Von der Leyen Commission 
(2019-2024) might constitute an important move away from traditional development 
thinking (Delputte et al. 2019). Inspired by postcolonial and post-development thinking, 
the existential question whether we should indeed still talk about development (policy) has 
been rising on the agenda of development studies. The European Association of 
Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) has publicly questioned the notion 
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of ‘development’ (Melber and Schöneberg 2018) and has recently published an edited 
volume proposing a ‘new vision’ of the field by ‘examining new paradigms and narratives, 
methodologies and scientific impact, and perspectives from the Global South’ (Baud et al. 
2019). Accordingly, EU Development scholars could perform more systematic research on 
the level of ideational changes, as they appear in documents and speeches from 
bureaucrats in the EU institutions as well as experts in the think-tank and policy community 
around it. In researching epistemic changes, more attention could be paid to non-European 
perspectives (cf. Vérez 2019; Kotsopoulos and Mattheis 2018), to ‘agency’ within so-called 
developing countries (cf. Murray-Evans 2018), and to interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g. 
critical law: Gammage 2017; history: Hansen and Jonsson 2014). 
 
A useful starting point would be the New European Consensus for Development (2017). 
Existing analyses have already pointed out the ambiguity of this text which stresses 
development goals on the one hand and EU migration, trade and security interests on the 
other hand (e.g. CONCORD 2017; Oxfam 2017). Moreover, the new Consensus has been 
criticized for lacking a clear strategic vision and being merely a comprehensive list of ideas 
(Bergmann et al 2019; Faure and Maxwell 2017). It remains to be studied, however, 
whether this indicates the erosion of the EMC paradigm or the moulting to another 
modernist research programme. In addition, it is unclear how and to what extent the EU 




Last but not least, power shifts may destabilize the current paradigm and provoke changes. 
EU development cooperation has undergone gradual but significant power shifts in favour 
of actors who do not entirely share the Post-Washington Consensus, both internally and 
worldwide. Internally, the European Commission’s administration dealing with 
development has shrunk in size and relevance, while other bureaucracies, including the 
European Commission’s DG Trade, DG Home, DG Near and the EEAS became more 
powerful (Furness 2012; Hurt 2010). At the time, the Development Commissioner and DG 
DEVCO were considered a powerhouse within the Brussels institutions, with a virtual 
monopoly of authority (Dimier 2014). In the 1960s-80s, the Development Commissioner 
determined the EU’s policies vis-à-vis nearly all developing countries. He used to negotiate 
ambitious trade agreements and manage extensive aid budgets (Carbone 2007). This 
changed in the 2000s, when the Development Commissioner slowly but steadily turned 
into an emperor without clothes. On the one hand, the competence to negotiate trade 
agreements – including the EPAs – shifted towards the Trade Commissioner (and DG 
Trade). On the other hand, the Commissioner for External relations (and DG Relex) and 
later also the Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy (and DG Near), gained more 
influence over the management of EU aid (Orbie and Versluys 2008: 70; Holland 2002: 
91). However, the emperor did not yet surrender, and DG Development tried to play a 
leading role in the international aid effectiveness agenda (Carbone 2007). But since the 
2010s, and especially since the creation of the EEAS, which became co-responsible for the 
programming of development aid, the emperor has become knocked of its pedestal (Orbie 
2012: 33). Today, important decisions are made by the EEAS, DG Trade, DG Near and 
even DG Home (on migration). Over the past decade DG Development lost twenty percent 
of its personnel (OECD DAC 2018: 74). The previous Development Commissioners 
(Piebalgs, 2009-2014; and Mimica, 2014-2019) are not perceived to have put a strong and 
distinctive stamp on EU politics. A Europe-wide online survey with politicians, 
policymakers, business leaders, journalists, civil society, NGOs and other stakeholders 
across Europe ranked Mimica second to last with an approval rating of 20.6 per cent, with 





Worldwide, the development landscape has changed drastically (Fejerskov 2013), 
characterized amongst others by the emergence of the BRICS (Holden 2019; Grimm and 
Hackenesch 2017; Lundsgaarde 2012; Kim and Lightfoot 2011) and the increased agency 
of African countries (Murray-Evans 2019; Chipaike and Knowledge 2018; Brown and 
Harman 2013). The impact of these power shifts is strongly debated, with some arguing 
that the G20’s Seoul Development Consensus represents a ‘paradigm shift’ or a radical 
break with the prevailing development model (Kharas 2011: 168) whereas others state 
that while ‘the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) […] put paid to 
that model. Yet it is not as if the ‘Beijing Consensus’ has popped up to replace it’ (Ferchen 
2010 in Blyth 2013: 12). However, it is clear that the alternative partnership models (cf. 
South-South cooperation) and development discourses have attracted many African 
countries that have been tired of the Western paternalist attitude (Taylor 2014). This, in 
turn, has increased their power vis-à-vis the EU (Lundsgaarde 2012). The EU, while 
remaining a large and essential development and trade partner for many African countries, 
is well aware of these shifting power dynamics and has at numerous occasions recognized 
that these global challenges require a different approach, as exemplified by the calls for 
‘Reducing poverty in a rapidly changing world’ in the Agenda for Change (2011) and ‘More 
effective EU action in a changing world’ in the New European Consensus (2017). 
 
These shifting power balances inside and outside the EU have been researched. Against 
the backdrop of the ‘values versus interests’ dichotomy, studies have pointed out that 
actors who do not favour the Post-Washington Consensus’ focus on poverty reduction are 
becoming more powerful. It is less clear, however, what this implies for the underlying 
EMC paradigm. Are those actors and institutions that are becoming more powerful (e.g. 
the EEAS, China) favouring another variant of the current paradigm or would they 
introduce elements of other (post-development?) thinking? 
 
This overview suggests that, for each of the conditions, we see changes, but no 
destabilization of the EMC enterprise. There seem limited signs of (1) a fully recognized 
crisis of the EU’s development policy, (2) that is challenged by a clear alternative paradigm, 
(3) that is supported by powerful people and institutions. However, it has also become 
clear that further research on conditions for change is needed. Another way to research 
changing paradigms is to look concretely at cases of policy experiments and how these 
reinvent or erode the existing paradigm. In order to illustrate this point, the next section 
will outline five main manifestations of experimentation that can be analysed in further 
research. 
 
UNDERSTANDING POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
Another avenue to study paradigm change is through case studies of policy experiments. 
New policy initiatives may emerge as a result of the above-mentioned policy failures, 
epistemic changes and power shifts. They may turn out to be limited and insignificant, 
thereby confirming continuity, or pave the way for second order changes whereby the 
dominant paradigm struggles to reinvent itself. However, they might also anticipate third 
order change by highlighting the anomalies of the current paradigm. 
 
EU development policy is continuously in development. Various new initiatives have been 
taken since the 2010s. The EU often also emphasizes the novelty of plans and proposals, 
and critics tend to agree that significant changes are being implemented (albeit in a more 
negative sense). While these new policies are often subjects of academic and policy-
oriented analyses, they are not linked to overarching questions of paradigm change and 
continuity. In this section, we discuss five illustrations of such recent and ongoing 
experiments: financing for the African Peace Facility (APF), the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development (EFSD), the Migration Trust Fund, cash transfers and vouchers 
in humanitarian aid, and the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA). What these 
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experiments have in common is that they (seem to) step away from existing EU 
development policy practice. 
These are not fully elaborated case studies, but merely examples of what future case 
studies could be oriented at. They have been sold by the EU as ‘innovative’ and 
‘experimental’ and/or they have been perceived like that by observers. In addition, they 
display some of the second order directions in which the experiments could go, including 
marketization, securitization and charitisation scenarios (see above). Hence, these 
experimental initiatives seem most relevant for our purpose to analyse the relevance of 
the changes in today’s development policy. Each time, we will indicate the challenges to 
which the initiatives aim to respond, evaluate their success in reaching their goals, and the 
significance of policy change. 
 
First, the disconnect between development policy and security policy has increasingly been 
perceived as an incoherence that needs to be addressed (Furness and Gänzle 2016). As 
the EU’s ambitions in foreign and security policy were growing since the 2000s, the position 
of development needed to be reconsidered. Experimenting with the security-development 
nexus, the EU has funded the APF with ODA since 2004 (Bagoyoko and Gibert 2009). 
Through the APF, the EU finances security-related action by the African Union and African 
regional organizations. The largest part of the APF budget supports the so-called African-
led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) which aim at providing public security through 
military and civilian means. In the past decade the EU has spent ever more ODA through 
the APF and provided support to 14 PSOs in 18 countries since its inception (European 
Commission 2019c).2 While it would be exaggerated to see this as evidence of a full-fledged 
securitization of EU development policy (Keukeleire and Raube 2013), it does constitute a 
relevant precursor of discussions at the level of the OECD DAC where the EU argued for 
more security-related expenses to be counted as ODA (CONCORD 2018b). 
 
Second, in response to the observation that official (public) aid will not be sufficient to 
promote development, and that it is difficult to mobilize more ODA in times of austerity, 
the EU has increasingly promoted private finance as the new 'Holy Grail' (see previous 
section). In this regard, EU investment facilities have proliferated since 2010 to leverage 
support for big investment projects. These facilities allow for blending: combining grants 
from EU aid with loans or equity from other public and private institutions. In 2017, the 
EFSD was established to finance the EU External Investment Plan (2016) and scale up 
private sector involvement in developing countries by combining the existing blending 
mechanisms. Based on a budget of €4.4 billion, this Fund should leverage up to €44 billion 
in investment projects. It also includes a new guarantee mechanism that covers part of 
the risks that investors take in challenging environments. In their introduction to the first 
Operational Report of the EFSD, the Development and Neighbourhood Commissioners 
speak of a ‘paradigm change’ (EU 2018: 4). These blending initiatives have indeed taken 
up a significant part of the EU budget and they do explore the boundaries of how private 
capital can be stimulated by the EU. They may signify a more neoliberal or marketized EU 
development policy (Holden 2020). However, they do not involve a complete overhaul of 
EU development policy, which remains largely based on ‘traditional’ ODA. Evaluations of 
previous EU blending activities, including by the European Court of Auditors, have been 
critical about the added value of blended finance, and it remains questionable whether the 
EFSD would make a more significant contribution (Lundsgaarde 2017). 
 
Third, the realization that the efficiency of EU aid sometimes leaves much to be desired, 
especially in emergency situations within specific regions and countries, has led to the 
creation of Trust Funds. Since January 2013, the Financial Regulation on the EU budget 
makes it possible to establish Trust Funds outside the EU’s budget and the traditional 
policy-making procedures. These sui generis funds aim for quicker and more efficient 
responses to emergency situations by combining different EU instruments and other 
donors’ contributions into a pooled fund that is managed at Union level for a limited 
duration (Regulation EC 1605/2002, 25 October 2012, Art 187). They also serve as 
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strategic instruments for the EU’s external relations (Carrera et al. 2018). To date, four EU 
trust funds have been created of which the infamous ‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa’, 
often called the ‘Migration Trust Fund’, is the most well-known and contested one. Created 
at the end of 2015 in response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’, the Trust Fund has been 
funded up to €4.2 billion. According to critical observers, the Fund signifies the 
instrumentalization of development aid for migration management purposes (Langan 
2018; CONCORD 2018a). However, its impact on migration flows remains unclear, it 
promotes various objectives ranging from ‘traditional’ development to migration control 
(European Court of Auditors 2018; Kipp 2018), and it is uncertain whether the Fund will 
be continued after 2020. 
 
Fourth, in response to perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of humanitarian aid in 
some situations, cash transfers and vouchers have increasingly been used by the EU. 
Mentioned as an ‘innovative modality’ in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 
(2008), DG ECHO has for many years been ‘testing’ its use through ‘pilot projects’ (OECD 
DAC 2019: 105), and it has been promoted explicitly in recent years (Council 2015; DG 
Echo 2013), so that cash transfers and vouchers made up over 38 per cent of the European 
Commission’s humanitarian aid in 2017. According to a recent evaluation, EU cash 
transfers constitute an ‘innovation’ and ‘best practice’ for cost-effectiveness in 
humanitarian aid (European Commission 2019e: 75), although international donors also 
warn that cash transfers only work under specific conditions and that ECHO should ‘be 
cautious with the general idea that cash transfer is the best response’ (European 
Commission 2019e: 121). Overall, it seems that cash transfers and vouchers are modalities 
that have not altered the underlying goals of EU humanitarian aid policy. 
 
Fifth, in 2007, in response to the increasingly recognized discrepancy between EU 
development and external climate change policies, the EU introduced the GCCA as an 
innovative instrument to mainstream climate change into development policy. The GCCA 
has constituted an important step in the construction of the climate-development nexus in 
the EU. Starting with only four pilot projects in 2008, it is now portrayed as the EU’s 
‘flagship initiative’ to help the world’s most vulnerable countries to address climate change 
through dialogue and technical and financial support for adaptation (EU 2015). The EU 
portrays the GCCA as ‘one of the most significant climate change initiatives in the world’ 
and its upgrade in 2014 presented the transformation into the GCCA+ as ‘new features’ 
and a new strategic orientation (EU 2015). While it has been noted that the GCC does not 
radically question the development paradigm, and that it has exported the EU’s ‘traditional’ 
development approach to the climate finance regime context (De Roeck 2019), this is again 
an issue for further research. 
 
In sum, these experimental initiatives do not seem to challenge the central tenets of the 
EMC paradigm. They may however entail second order change of EU development policy, 
for instance in the form of marketization (deepening and enlargement of markets, cf. 
private finance and blending), securitization (protection of borders and security, cf. APF), 
or charitisation (saving human lives, cf. through cash transfers and vouchers). Further 
research should examine these and other second order scenarios in a more analytically 




While policy and academic discourses point to important shifts in EU development policy, 
it remains difficult to ascertain the level of these changes. The main aim of this article was 
to propose a research agenda on change and continuity in EU development policy. Drawing 
on the literatures on paradigm change and post-development, this involves four key 
questions for future research: (1) How can we map the EU’s current paradigm?; (2) How 
can we map changes and continuities in this regard?; (3) How can we explain changes and 
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continuities?; (4) What role do policy experiments play in this regard? These questions are 
elaborated and illustrated throughout the article, with particular attention for existing 
literature and issues for future research. With this research agenda, we envisage a deeper 
understanding of the many challenges of EU development policy, as illustrated throughout 
this special issue. 
 
Normatively speaking, we also problematize the underlying Eurocentric, modernist and 
colonial paradigm of EU development. Given that EU and international policies are more 
and more politicized, it is likely that also development policy will at some point become the 
subject of public scrutiny beyond the relatively shielded ‘Brussels bubble’ of EU institutions 
and affiliated think tanks. Therefore, it would seem wise for the EU to engage in a more 
existential reflection on what ‘development’ and ‘development policy’ mean and on whether 
the assumptions of the previous decades should still be valuable. Paradigmatic and post-
development perspectives can contribute to these debates as they force us to think the 
unthinkable, not only about the future relations between the EU and the so called 
‘developing countries’, but also about the nature of the EU itself. 
 
The proposed research agenda should indeed also allow for a better acknowledgement of 
the diversity or ‘pluriverse’ of alternatives to ‘development’ within Europe. Whereas 
member states and civil society actors in the EU may share the same underlying paradigm, 
there are various ways in which ‘development’ (policies) have been conceived and notable 
alternatives are in the making. Such a plEUriverse (Delputte et al. forthcoming) would 
involve a rejection of monolithical thinking and allow for critical, complexity-sensitive and 
interdisciplinary research that delves into the different cultural, historical and political 
economy backgrounds of different EU views on the good life in Europe and elsewhere. 
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1 These values include ‘diversity and pluriversality, autonomy and self-reliance, solidarity and reciprocity, commons and 
collective ethics, oneness with and rights of nature, interdependence, simplicity and enoughness, inclusiveness and dignity, 
justice and equity, non-hierarchy, dignity of labour, rights and responsibilities, ecological sustainability, non-violence and 
peace’. 
2 In the Commission’s proposed future budget for external action, the APF would be included in a new off-budget European 
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